Abstract:Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) rely on artificial intelligence (AI) to accurately detect objects and interpret their surroundings. However, even when trained using millions of miles of real-world data, AVs are often unable to detect rare failure modes (RFMs). The problem of RFMs is commonly referred to as the "long-tail challenge", due to the distribution of data including many instances that are very rarely seen. In this paper, we present a novel approach that utilizes advanced generative and explainable AI techniques to aid in understanding RFMs. Our methods can be used to enhance the robustness and reliability of AVs when combined with both downstream model training and testing. We extract segmentation masks for objects of interest (e.g., cars) and invert them to create environmental masks. These masks, combined with carefully crafted text prompts, are fed into a custom diffusion model. We leverage the Stable Diffusion inpainting model guided by adversarial noise optimization to generate images containing diverse environments designed to evade object detection models and expose vulnerabilities in AI systems. Finally, we produce natural language descriptions of the generated RFMs that can guide developers and policymakers to improve the safety and reliability of AV systems.
Abstract:We introduce the AI Security Pyramid of Pain, a framework that adapts the cybersecurity Pyramid of Pain to categorize and prioritize AI-specific threats. This framework provides a structured approach to understanding and addressing various levels of AI threats. Starting at the base, the pyramid emphasizes Data Integrity, which is essential for the accuracy and reliability of datasets and AI models, including their weights and parameters. Ensuring data integrity is crucial, as it underpins the effectiveness of all AI-driven decisions and operations. The next level, AI System Performance, focuses on MLOps-driven metrics such as model drift, accuracy, and false positive rates. These metrics are crucial for detecting potential security breaches, allowing for early intervention and maintenance of AI system integrity. Advancing further, the pyramid addresses the threat posed by Adversarial Tools, identifying and neutralizing tools used by adversaries to target AI systems. This layer is key to staying ahead of evolving attack methodologies. At the Adversarial Input layer, the framework addresses the detection and mitigation of inputs designed to deceive or exploit AI models. This includes techniques like adversarial patterns and prompt injection attacks, which are increasingly used in sophisticated attacks on AI systems. Data Provenance is the next critical layer, ensuring the authenticity and lineage of data and models. This layer is pivotal in preventing the use of compromised or biased data in AI systems. At the apex is the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) layer, dealing with the most complex and challenging aspects of AI security. This involves a deep understanding and strategic approach to counter advanced AI-targeted attacks, requiring comprehensive knowledge and planning.
Abstract:Existing adversarial example research focuses on digitally inserted perturbations on top of existing natural image datasets. This construction of adversarial examples is not realistic because it may be difficult, or even impossible, for an attacker to deploy such an attack in the real-world due to sensing and environmental effects. To better understand adversarial examples against cyber-physical systems, we propose approximating the real-world through simulation. In this paper we describe our synthetic dataset generation tool that enables scalable collection of such a synthetic dataset with realistic adversarial examples. We use the CARLA simulator to collect such a dataset and demonstrate simulated attacks that undergo the same environmental transforms and processing as real-world images. Our tools have been used to collect datasets to help evaluate the efficacy of adversarial examples, and can be found at https://github.com/carla-simulator/carla/pull/4992.